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RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND STRATEGY IN SOUTH KOREA: 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
 
An appropriate national strategy for rural development is an impor­
tant matter of concern for both policymakers and citizenry in developing
 
countries. This paper will examine South Korea's experience in rural
 
development strategy and particularly the linkage of this strategy with an
 
overall developmental policy planning for the national economy. The
 
political system characteristics, needless to say, exert certain influ­
ences upon the process of rural development policy making and implemen­
tation in developing countries. Sincc South Korea throughout most of its
 
recent history has exhibited a centralized style of decision making, the
 
question of how to reconcile the overall national policy requirement at
 
the center with the rural developmental needs in the periphery has become
 
a difficult issue to resolve. Rural development, by definition, involves
 
active participation by the citizenry in the remote regions. The policies
 
and programs of rural development (in a country like South Korea), how­
ever, are articulated by the government elite at the center.
 
In analyzing the center-periphery relations with respect to rural
 
development policy making, therefore, a number of relevant questions in
 
regard to articulating policy objectives and participation in the policy
 
process must be kept in mind. What, for instance, are the objectives of
 
rural development policy as pursued by the national government elite? To 
what extent do local elites and rural residents participate in the process 
of formulating and implementing developmental projects? Who actually are 
rural development policies and-programs at theresponsible for the promoting 
center? This paper will proceed to examine a set of three inter-related
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topics: (a) Korea's overall developmental strategy of the national economy
 
•7ith a view to ascertain the nature of the rural development policy in its 
proper perspective, (b) the factors of Korea's rural environment to the 
extent that they influence the making and implementation of rural develop­
ment policy, and (c) the relevance to other developing countries of the
 
Korean experience in adopting "delayed" or "belated" rural development stra­
tegies.
 
I. KOREAN DEVELOPMENT IN PERSPECTIVE
 
Rural development policy in South Korea is an integral part of the 
over-all package of the national policy planning for economic development.
 
As such the role of the central government is clearly evident in guiding
 
the processes of both Socio-economic development and rural and agricultural 
development. A series of five year economic development plans have been 
put into effect in South Korea since 1962, following the military take-over 
of power on May 16, 1961 by then-Brigadier GeneralPark Chung Hee. A dompre­
hensive strategy for rural development was not adopted by the national 
government leaders, however, until early in the 1970s, as a part of the 
TFYP (1972-76).The latter's three-fold objective was: to assure (a) agri­
culture's contribution to the overall economic development, (b) the improve­
ment of the quality of rural life, and (c) the attainment of near self­
sufficiency in food produccion.
 
During the period of the first three Five Year Plans (1962-1976),
 
South Korea attained a rapid rate of ecunomic growth and thus transformed 
itself from a backward agrarian society into a semi-industrial, middle in­
come, newly industrializing country. In 1961 Korea was one of the poorest 
LDCs, with heavy dependence on agriculture. But since then Korea's GNP 
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grew over the fifteen-year period between 1962 and 1976 at an average rate
 
of more than ten percent annually, and its per capita income tripled in
 
real terms in the same period. The manufacturing sector grew at 17 percent
 
annually in constant prices, increasing its share in GNP from 14 percent to
 
30 percent, while the share of agriculture fell from 40 percent to less
 
than 25 percent. The engine of economic growth for South Korea during 
this period was the export of manufactured goods as the gross value of these 
exports rose from $41 million in 1961 to $8 billion in 1976 in the 1975 
constant prices, representing an overall real growth of exports, of 33 per­
cent annually. In 1976 exports constituted 36 percent of the GNP.I
 
During the Fourth Five Year Plan period (1977-81), the economic growth
 
did not keep up wLth the earlier dynamism. In 1980, for insLance, South 
Korea registered a negative growth of minus 7.6 percent for the first time. 
The economic setback registered in 1980, in spite of its good performance 
in the preceding three years of 1977-79, was a reminder that the country
 
was still vulnerable economically, although the economic planners considered
 
this slowdown to be a temporary setback. A number of factors contributed 
to this downfall in the economy. Among them are the political uncertainty 
and instability following the assassintion of President Park Chung Hee
 
in October 1979, the world-wide economic recession and inflation following 
the OPEC price hike in 1979, the loss of the competitiveness of the Korean 
export goods in world market due to rise in labor cost, etc.
 
Rural development policy in Korea was formulated and put into effect 
by the national government leaders as part and parcel of the overall econ­
omic development strategy. During the first three Five Year Plan periods 
(196-1976) the agricultural sector of the economy was not developing as 
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rapidly as industrial sectors, although the value added in agriculture
 
grew at more than four percent annually, indicating a fairly respectable
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rate of productivity growth in this important sector. In fact, agri­
cultural and rural sectors were utilized by the national policy makers to
 
support developmental needs of industrial and urban sectors of the economy.
 
Thus, the rising demand for labor in the industrial and rural sectors
 
caused heavy outmigration from the rural areas. During the three yive
 
Year Plans period (1961-1976) more than two million jobs were created in 
industry. While the overall rate of employment growth was 3.9 percent a 
year, the growth in agricultural employment was only one percent a year
 
this period. 3 during 
Obviously, the national government elites in South Korea relied on the 
developmental strategy of "unbalanced and selective growth" of the economy 
by giving primary emphasis to programs of industrialization first. As a 
result the agricultural and rural sectors of the economy were relatively
 
slower in growth and lagged behind the urban and industrial sectors of the 
economy throughout the 1960s. As the urban-rural gap and disparity in in­
come began to widen, however, the government leaders recognized the poten­
tially serious nature of this problem and instituted numerous policy 
measures for correcting the situation by increasing agricultural and rural 
income. This was started in 1967 when the Park Chung Hee Government put 
into effect the government price support policies in agriculture to improve 
the agricultural terms of trade. Although economically costly, the govern­
ment adopted the grain price policy instituting a higher purchase price
 
for rice from the farmers and a lower resale price for the industrial.
 
and urban dwellerg. 
4 
workers 
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This price support policy, as Table 1 below shows, stemmed the de­
cline in the rural income as compared with the urban income, at least for 
the time being.
 
TABLE I ABOUT HERE
 
The underlining logic of the costly grain price support policy was that
 
the rural sector was entitled to skare the benefits of rapid economic 
growth that characterized the Korean economy in the five .!ar plan period. 
In short, the national government elites in South Korea began to pay due
 
attention to the equity and distribution of the benefits of economic
 
growth as well as to the continuous economic growth.5
 
Starting in 1970, timed with the implementation of the Third Five
 
Year Plan (1972-197 6) more government efforts were directed toward improv­
ing the quality of rural life. Through the inauguration of the rural
 
development programs, called the Saemaul Undong (the New Community Move­
ment) in 1970, the government of President Park Chung Hee increased its
 
investment and expenditure for such infra-structure as roads, electricity,

6 
telephones, piped water, etc. The objective of the Saemaul Movement was
 
"to develop self-reliance, leadership, and a sense of community and thus
 
to release latent development energies throughout the rural Korea." For
 
this purpose the villages were urged by the central government to improve
 
their living environment and productivity. Although the village committees
 
selected projects that were to be implemented principally by volunteer 
labor, the central government stepped in to provide assistance in 
cash and building materials. The success and failure of developmental 
projects ultimately would depend on the level of the organizational ability
 
with each village. The indigenous capacity and awareness o' the needs of
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TABLE I.
 
Rural and Urban Income Levels in South Korea, 1961-1976
 
(in percent)
 
Ratio of Rural Incomes to Urban Incomes*
 
Type of Income 
1963 1968 1973 1975 1976 
Household 116 63 87 102 100 
Per Capita 107 57 80 93 91 
Per Worker 43 27 41 48 47 
Sources: 
 EPB, Annual Report on the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (Seoul,
1974), MAF, Report on the Results of Farm Household Economy Survey (Seoul,
1975); EPB, Monthly Statistics of Korea, January 1976; as cited in Hasan
 
and Rao, p. 41.
 
These ratios are of the average monthly incomes of farm households to those
 
of urban wage and salary earners.
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each village was important to motivate the villagers to want to improve 
their status. The Korean villages first started with such simple projects 
as roof improvements and drains, but they progressively moved on to other
 
infrastructure projects, such as building roac:, bridges, and irrigation,
 
and then on to schemes for raisin-g supplementary incomes, such as livestock
 
raising, silk production, specialty crops, and cottage industries.7
 
By the end of the 1970s the South Korean rural communities generally
 
improved materially in terms of the quality of rural life. That the Korean
 
villages enjoy a high level of basic services as compared with some other
 
LDCs, is evident from these statistics. In 1976 there were some 2.8 mil­
lion rural households in 45,000 villages, of which about 18,600 were
 
legally constituted, each having 100 or more households. All villages had
 
easy access to primary schools, and most villages to middle schools. Family
 
planning material was widely disseminated, and the rural fertility rates
 
were declining about as fast as the urban rates. About 91 percent of all
 
households had access to electricity. More than one-half of the legal
 
villages also had community telephones, while almost all the villages were
 
fairly well connected by roads although there was much room for improve­
ment in the quality of rural access roads. Access to piped water, however,
 
was still relatively low.8 On the whole the distribution of most services
 
was probably better in South Korea than that in other countries at compar­
able levels of development. 
II. RURAL ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY MAKING
 
The specific measures to enhance the quality of rural life, such as 
those shown in the preceding discussion, were not put into effect until
 
8
 
relatively late in the developmental process. The central decision makers 
adopted the rural development policy only as a "delayed response" to the 
rural needs. Although an increasing urban-rural disparity was perceived 
to 
be a serious policy issue, the political elite in South Korea decided 
to allocate the limited national resources first to development projects 
of the urban and industrial sector of the economy, thereby giving less
 
emphasis to the agricultural and rural development projects, at least in
 
the initial stage of the economic development process. Given the fact 
that South Korea was traditionally an agrarian society, and the majority 
of the population resided in the country side, this lopsided and unbalanced
 
approach to growth favoring the urban and industrial sector was not with­
out political risk and was also unpopular. Fortunately for the South
 
Korean leaders, however, this policy paid off in the long run, thanks to
 
the success of rapid economic growth led by industrialization of the
 
economy.
 
The policy of "delayed gratification" of the rural sector con­was 
sciously promoted by the national leadership in the early stage of the 
economic development process. It was a political decision but felt un­
avoidable by the leadership in view of the limited resources the country 
was endowed with. The formulation and imilementation of the rural develop­
ment policies, under the circumstances, was influenced by the specific 
conditions and environmental constraints that prevailed in the countryside 
of Korea. These included a set of four specific considerations, namely, 
the character of Korea's farm structure, the state of agricultural tech­
nology, the pattern or regional variation, and the local political linkage 
with the central government. Each of these factors will, in turn, be 
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elaborated upon next.
 
i. Farm Structure
 
Two of the major difficulties confronting agriculture in South Korea
 
according to a government publication in 1975, were "low agricultural pro­
duction" and "uneconomic organization of farming." The structural charac­
teristics of Korean farming, such as rice plantation and small farm size,
 
are taken into account as given factors by the policy makers in adopting an
 
overall developmental strategy for the national economy.
 
Of the total area of 22 million hectares of the Korean peninsula, South
 
Korea below the denilitarized zone occupies approximately 10 million hectares,
 
and only 23 percent of this land (or 2.24 million hectares) are cultivated.
 
The paddy land suited for the rice plantation, approximately 13 percent of
 
the total area, is located mainly in the four main river valleys and in the
 
small plains along the western and southern coasts. Most of the arable land
 
in Korea is used quite intensively; there is even double cropping, partic­
ularly in the southern plains, where rice is the main summer crop and barley
 
or wheat is grown in the winter months. Despite concerted efforts to expand
 
the irrigation and drainage facilities, only 85 percent of the total culti­
vated area in 1975 was irrigated. Agricultural crop production in Korea
 
still depends heavily on weather conditions.
 
Furthermore, the small size of farms, heavy concentration of rice
 
farming, and low supply of agricultural capital make it difficult for the
 
Korean farmers to switch from a traditional and subsistence-level to more
 
modern and commercial farming. The small size and poor organization of the
 
farms are evident from the fact that in 1975 the per farm household land­
holding in South Korea was only 0.94 hectares. Also, land plots are so
 
92 
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scattered as to require an average of four different plots per household.
 
Since a supplementary nonfarm source of household income for an average
 
Korean farmer is also meager, 18.1 percent in 1975 as compared with 71.1
 
percent for an average Japanese farm household, it is reasonable to conclude
 
that agriculture in South Korea has a long way to go 
to attain moderniza­
1 0
 
tion.
 
Nonetheless, the contribution made by the agricultural 
sector to
 
Korea's overall performance of the economy in the three Five Year Plan
 
periods (196 2-1976) has often been overlooked. Agriculture in Korea, as a
 
recent World Bank report emphasizes, "already was well advanced by the
 
early 1960s" which "enabled government to devote more attention and re­
sources to the urban and industrialFor 
 instance, the land
 
reform in 1947 and 1948 fixed "a ceiling of three hectares on landholdings,
 
in an effort not only to 
bring about greater social equality through re­
distribution of three quarters of 
cultivable land, 
but also to remove the 
feudal obstacles that 
so 
often hindered agricultural development" in
 
other LDCs. 
 More than 2 million hectares, or virtually all of Korea's
 
cultivable land, were under intensive cultivation in 1961, producing some
 
percent of the country's requirements for grain. Average yields of
 
rice in South Korea 
were about 2.3 tons a hectare, which is nearly one-third
 
more than the yields generally obtained in countries of Southeast Asia.
 
Moreover, with the introduction of the new improved seedlings of rice, as
 
much as 6 tons per hectare of rice were reported in certain locations of
 
Korea.
 
ii. Agricultural Technology
 
Korea's agricultural technology was also taken into account by policy
 
makers in adopting developmental strategies in Korea. The state of
 
agricultural technology in Korea was characterized by labor-intensive and
 
partial animal agriculture. The use of machines was not only limited,
 
approximately one motor or machine for every 40 farm workers in early 1970s,
 
but the use of animal and human labor was also extensive, one draft bull
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or cow for every four men.
 
Korean agriculture, being primarily a rice economy, naturally depends
 
heavily upon an irrigation system. In this respect Korean agriculture is
 
similar to that in Japan and Taiwan, although the water control technology
 
is not as well developed in Korea as in Japan or Taiwan. Other agricultural
 
technologies, such as plant protection and fertilization, are slightly
 
inferior to Japan while they may be similar to those in Taiwan. The fact
 
that Korea is located close to the world's northern most boundary for rice
 
production, however, is an important consideration. This means that a pre­
cipitious and warm sutmMLr climate and a heavy doze of fertilizers is
 
essential for Korea's rice harvesting. Under this generally harsh environ­
ment it is rather remarkable that the agricultural yields in Korea have 
been generally high. 
Korean agriculture has not adopted thus far the cattle-raising tech­
nology and forage production technology. Traditionally in Korea, forage
 
has been a byproduct of the grains and low productive forest (or bush)
 
lands. Livestock industry in Korea, including beef, hog, poultry and dairy,
 
therefore depends on the import of feed grains from abroad. Given the
 
fact of Korea's temperate zone climate, Korean agriculture can easily
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adapt to, as well as innovate, new cattle technology and the technologies
 
of other livestock industries. However, the limited land space available
 
for raising livestock may not be conducive to such innovations. Finally,
 
Korean agriculture is relatively advanced in traditional fruit and vege­
table production. However, agricultural marketing and food processing
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technologies are still traditional and generally less developed.
 
iii. Regional Variation and Disparity
 
South Korea has been beset by two kinds of disparities in the process
 
of socio-economic modernization: the first is the urban-rural disparity
 
and the second is regional variation in the standards of living. While
 
the urban-rural gap in income was the natural result of the government's
 
pursuing industrialization as the overall strategy for economic develop­
ment, the variation between different regions in South Korea was the con­
sequence of the national political elite adopting a deliberate design for
 
selective growth. Consequently, the regional emphasis was politically
 
motivated. The inter-regional disparity is strikng, although it is
 
gradually being reduced with the overall progress in the economy and
 
through the rural modernization begun in the early 1970s.
 
The contrast between the urban areas and the rural communities, in
 
terms of sharing the benefits of the rapid economic growth, has manifested
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itself in the lopsided growth of the metropolitan regions in South Korea.
 
The special cities of Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, etc., are political, economic,
 
cultural and educational centers of the country, where the standard of
 
living is generally higher than that in the countryside, except for those
 
residing in the squatter settlements. The capital city of Seoul, with
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population of close to eight million, is overcrowded with more than 20
 
percent of the total population of South Korea residing in the city. Rural
 
Korea, in turn, consists of some 45,000 villages which are administratively
 
organized into nine provinces and 175 counties. Some forty cities of the
 
population over 50,000 connect these villages in a network of spatial
 
communication and control.
 
Although South Korea is homogeneous in culture and centralized in
 
politics, factors to be examined more fully later, the country suffers from
 
regional variation which is a result of a long historical tradition and
 
culture. The contrast exists, for instance, between the Koreans originating
 
from the southern provinces and those from the northern provinces, particularly
 
those who came to the south as refugees after World War II, the war. which
 
divided Korea territorially and politically into the communist North Korea
 
and the non-communist South Korea. The contrast is especially striking in
 
South Korea between those who come from southeastern provinces (Kyongsang)
 
and those from southwestern provinces (Cholla).
 
This regional disparity and rivalry between the southeast and the
 
southwest was deepened by the economic development policy pursued by Presi­
dent Park Chung Hee in the 1960s and the 1970s and the differential regional
 
impact. The Korean government,it the initial stage of economic development
 
plans, emphasized the southeastern region and neglected the developmental
 
needs of the southwestern region in the process. The modern highway system
 
was built first to connect Pusan and St:iul in 1969, while that to link the
 
provincial capital of Kwangju and Seoul did not materialize until 1974.
 
This was true in terms of the government determining the location of
 
industrial complexes, which are heavily concentrated in the southeastern
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provinces rather than in the southwestern provinces.
 
It was also popularly perceived in South Korea that the people of the
 
Kyongsang origin were given priority over those of the Cholla origin. The
 
fact that President Park himself and the present President Chun Du Hwan of
 
the Fifth Republic originated from the Kyongsang provinces may be no accident,
 
according to these critics, nor is the imprisonment of the dissident poli­
tical leader, Kim Dae Jung, who is native son of the city of Mokpo, South
 
Cholla Province. Kim, as an opposition party leader, unsuccessfully
 
challenged Park Chung Hee in the 1969 presidential election and later was
 
exiled and subsequently abducted to South Korea from his Tokyo hotel by the
 
KCIA agents in 1973. Timed with the insurrection of Kwangju, the provincial
 
city of South Cholla, in May 1980, Kim Dae Jung was court martialed and
 
sentenced to death, a sentence subsequently commuted to life imprisonment by
 
President Chun on the occasion of his celebrated trip to Washington, D.C.,
 
to confer with U.S. President Ronald Reagan in January 1981. On March 1,
 
1982 Kim's term was commuted to twenty years, as part of an overall amnesty
 
to mark the one year anniversary of the inauguration of Chun as President
 
of the Fifth Republic. 
The two Kyongsang provinces constitute the backbone of the economy in
 
South Korea. With the industrial complexes along the coastal cities of
 
Ulsan, P'ohang, Ch'angwon, they constitute a large proportion of the manu­
facturing industries of the country such as the steel production, oil 
refining and machine-building, including more than half of the nation's
 
textile output. Even the agricultural output of these provinces is im­
pressive, with one-third of the national rice production, over 40 percent
 
of its barley and wheat, close to two-fifths of its silk, and three-quarters
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of its apples. The land area is approximately one fourthof the total but
 
the population is approximately 30 percent of the total. 16
 
The two Cholla provinces are often characterized as "a remote poverty­
stricken area, in which development lags behind the rest of the country."17
 
This stereotype view, although somewhat exaggerated, is based on the fact
 
that almost four-fifths of the populat:"on early in the 1970s was engaged in
 
primary industry, and only two percent was in manufacturing. Cholla Namdo
 
has had the lowest per capita income of any province, while the annual in­
come of households in the Cholla provincial capitals, Chonju and Kwangju,
 
has been lowe-: than that of other provincial capitals such as Taegu and
 
Pusan, Kyongsang Bukdo aud Namdo.1
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iv. Local Political Links with National Politics
 
South Korea is a highly centralized and unitary political system. All
 
the initiative for important policy decisions originates from the center,
 
while the local government agencies execute these policies as "directives" 
from the national government. Therefore, it is important to ascertain the
 
limited scope and role of local governments in the overall scheme of
 
formulating and implementing the rural development policies in South Korea.
 
A system of government that reflects the model of a popularly-elected coun­
cil and executive body, as it is commonly known in the West, does not exist
 
19 
in South Korea. The government agencies at the lower level, including
 
the township (village), county (city Gu) or provincial (special city)
 
levels, of course, conduct day-to-day business of governing. But these
 
bodies are administrative agencies responsible to the central government,
 
not directly to the people they serve. Any policy which local government
 
agencies administer, including the rural development policy, is therefore
 
16
 
the responsibility of the central government, not that of the local govern­
ment agencies.
 
The limited nature of local government agencies and their role in im­
plementing policy decisions, including the rural development policies, has
 
been described by a Western observer in these words:
 
Local governmental agencies in South Korea are tightly inte­
grated into a highly centralized, bureaucratic administrative
 
system directed from Seoul. Very little authority or initia-.
 
tive is delegated to provincial and county levels, where self­
administration and the carrying out of directives from above
 
are the principal functions.., by and large they (officials)
 
do not see themselves as representing or reflecting the
 
opinions, desires, and needs of villagers in their districts.
 
Rather they !end to be overwhelmingly concerned with finding
 
ways of handling pressures from higher echelons for the ful­
fillment of predetermined plans and quotas. 2 0 
Participation at the grass roots and input from below to decision-making
 
by the lower echelons of the government are, therefore, an exception
 
rather than the rule in South Korea.
 
The centralized decision making in South Korea sometimes has the ad­
vantage of a seemingly thorough implementation of decisions which are made
 
by the national government. Government decisions are issued as policies
 
and commands which the provincial and local governments down the hierarchy 
are expected to carry out faithfully. Disadvantages of the centralized
 
decision making, however, must be pointed out as they often include an ex­
cessive bureaucraticism and reduced efficiency, generally associated with
 
the lack of initiative and dedication by the lower echelon bureaucracy. 
The implementation of the rural development policies in Korea inevitably
 
suffers from the difficulty of coordination among the various government
 
units not only at the center but at the local level as well. 21 The
 
government agencies responsible for formulating the agricultural and rural
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policies, for instance, are the Economic Planning Board (EPB), Ministry of
 
Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Al­
though the formulation of the rural development policies is vested in the 
hands of the agricultural ministry in close coordination with the EPB, the 
policy implementation is the responsibility of the home affairs ministry
 
by virtue of its maintaining an extensive network of local government and
 
Thus, the governors
administration, which is the jurisdiction of the MHA. 

of the nine provinces in South Korea are "appointed" rather than "elected" 
positions and they are administratively responsible to the home affairs 
ministry. The implementation of the rural development programs is thus 
2 2the MAF.in the MHA, notvested 
All the local organizations above the village level that are in some 
in rural development in South Korea are either governmentalways involved 
or quasi-governmental agencies. The common structural feature of these local
 
strong vertical linkages to higher-level organiza­organizations is a set of 
tions which eventually culminate in central organizations in Seoul.
23 This 
principle of centralization applies, therefore, not only to the local 
government system but to the quasi-government agencies as well, such as the 
agricultural cooperatives called the National Agricultural Cooperatives
 
The importance of NACF in implementing the rural develop-
Federation (NACF). 

can mobilize local support
ment policies in Korea lies in the fact that it 

In 1972 there were more than 2.2 million farmers
throughout the country. 

who became members of over 6,700 primary cooperatives which, in turn, were 
organized into 140 county cooperatives and nine regional branch offices of 24 
the rigid tradition
NACF. The operation of NACF, however, suffers from 
Its operation is held accountable not sufficiently to the
of centralism. 
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public or the member cooperatives but to the whim and desire of the govern­
ment officials who use it as an instrument for manipulating the market of
 
food grains and agricultural commodities.
 
The centralized and hierarchical pattern of ruiral development policy
 
making in South Korea also stems from the deep historical and cultural
 
tradition of the Korean society. As Vincent Brandt, 
an anthropologist, ob­
served:
 
Historically, in Korea, there has been a very high degree of 
centralization of prestige and power in the hands of a cen­
tral bureaucratic elite that administered local areas through 
rigidly hierarchical organizations. Such traditions were 
reinforced and rationalized under colonial rule, and a good
deal of the organizational framework and administrative pro­
cedure existing today has been derived from models imposed on 
Korea by the Japanese. Since 1945, effortu have been made 
to promote varying degrees of local autonomy, but at present 
there is virtually no popular participation either in the 
choice of local officials or in the formulation of the 
policies they implement. 2 5 
South Korea thus is characterized as a highly centralized political system. 
The political power and authority are concentrated in the hands of the
 
national political elites in the center: local autonomy is not allowed
 
and elections are not held. The officals of the provinces and "special
 
cities" are centrally appointed rather than elected locally. This tradi­
tion of the central control of local governments makes South Korea an
 
authoritarian political system in the opinion of many observers of South
 
Korea.
 
South Korea is also homogeneous as a nation. Not only are the Korean
 
people homogeneous as an ethnic group but they have the tradition of a long­
standing history as a cohesive and unified nation producing a distinctive
 
culture. No known minority group, for instance, exists in Korea to
 
challenge the central authority, although local and regional factors have
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historically played some role in the political life of Korea. This condi­
tion 	of centralization of government authority and homogeneity of culture
 
led 	some students of Korea to claim that the vortex phenomenon exists in
 
Korean politics. Thus, according to Gregory Henderson:
 
In Korea... the imposiiton of a continuous high degree of
 
centralism on a homogeneous society has resulted in a vor­
tex, a powerful, upward-sucking force activw throughout
 
the culture. This force is such as to detach particles
 
from any integrative groups that the society might tend to
 
build--social classes, political parties, and other inter­
mediary groups--thus eroding group consolidation and
 
forming a general atomized upward mobility.
26
 
Centralization and homogeneity as characteristic marks of the Korean
 
political culture perhaps led to the rise of definitive features of the
 
Korean political system. The political marketplace in Korea provides an
 
arena whereby the exchange relationship takes place between the center and
 
the periphery or between the regime and the key sectors of the Korean
 
society. These characteristics, translated into the language of the
 
political economy and market processes, mean that the political arena in
 
South Korea is "overly nationalized in scope" and "overly politicized in
 
terms of the dominance of the periphery by the center. 
2 7 
III. 	 THE RELEVANCE OF KOREAN EXPERIENCE
 
What lessons, if any, can we learn from the Korean example? In
 
assessing the relevance of the Korean experience in rural development and
 
developmental strategies, one is tempted to argue that the Korean case is
 
unique and therefore not replicable. It reflects the peculiar circumstances
 
of Korea as a divided nation politically and also as an East Asian country
 
of the Confucian cultLLal heritage. This line of reasoning would suggest
 
that the lessons of Korea may not be transferable to other LDCs in the
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Third World. At the same time one can argue, however, that Korea belongs 
to a type of political system in the Third World which is commonly iden­
tifiable 
with attaining rapid economic growth, centralization of power and 
a military-dominant regime, the kind of Politico-economic system which is 
often referred to as NICs (Newly Industrializing Countries). The Korean
 
experience may be of particular interest and value to the leaders of those
 
countries in the Third World whose political system is characterized by a
 
"command" type of political structure, not "polyarchic" or "bargaining" 
type. The "top-down and center-outward strategy" of rural development 
might work more efficiently for such countries in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. 
 Thus, this study may suggest some clue as to formulating the
 
political economy rules of rural development and the center-periphery rela­
tionship in a centralized "command" type and authoritarian political system. 
South Korea since her independence in 1948 has been authoritarian in 
politics, excapt for a brief interlude of the Second Republic (1960-61).
 
Its politics has been authoritarian in the 
sense that no firm foundation
 
and tradition of democratic rule has existed in the nation's history. 
The 
military has emerged through a series of coups to become the dominant 
institution and a powerful force in Korean politics. The military-civilian 
fusionist regime has emerged in Korea both in the Third Republic and the
 
Yushin era (1961-79) and in the Fourth Republic era (1980 on). Under this 
authoritarian system the military transformed itself following the initial
 
assumption of power into a nominally "civilianized" government through the 
clever manipulation of the electoral rules and conducting a constitutional
 
referendum. The military-turned-to-civilian leadership has subsequently 
been in firm control of politics, permitting the government to be managed
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by an army of civilian bureaucrats and technocrats who have now become 
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coopted into the political structure. In this sense the military­
civilian fusionist regime in South Korea is not too dissimilar from the 
"Bureaucratic Authoritarian" polities that have been noted in some Latin 
American countries like Brazil, Chile and Mexico. 
2 9 
Authoritarian civilianized military regimes generally enhance the 
legitimacy of their political rule through the successful implementation 
of programs directed toward attaining rapid economic growth. 3 0  To achieve 
the policy objective of economic growth the central government in these 
countries invests considerably in projects of national infrastructure
 
building, such projects as the national highways, transportation and com­
munication systems, educational systems, etc. It also invests its scarce
 
resources in projects of administrative infrastructure building in the
 
rural areas, such as initiating the self-help movement in the rural areas,
 
signaling the shift in the developmental priorities, perhaps away from the
 
"industrialization first and equalization later" to the simultaneous develop­
ment of the industry and agriculture. This shift in emphasis results from
 
the belated realization by the central government that the equalization
 
measures, such as the rural development projects, would assist the less
 
developed sectors of the economy and population, such as agriculture and
 
rural residents. The welfare of the latter groups needs to be promoted by
 
the central government so that 'he rural dwellers can catch up with the 
leading sectors of the industry and the urban dwellers who are the primary
 
beneficiaries of the growth-oriented strategy of industrialization. 
Based on the case study of South Korea's rural development strategies, 
a series of hypotheses regarding the center-periphery relations may now be 
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formulated, as follows:
 
1. 
In a centralized authoritarian political system, development
 
programs in the periphery are formulated and executed more in accordance
 
with the national government plans and less in terms of the local develop­
ment needs and demands. (This does not preclude the possibility, however, 
that political symbols are often utilized and political strategies and
 
tactics are widely employed to give an impression of authority devolution
 
by the central government, in the form of urging and encouraging local
 
initiative and self-help measures, such as the Saemaul Movement in South
 
Korea in the 1970s).
 
2. Dispensation of the national resources to meet the local develop­
mental needs is affected in a centralized political system by (a) the
 
political will and determination of the political leadership at the center,
 
(b) the perception of the local developmental needs by the national pol­
itical elites, and (c) the estimation of opportunity costs (or alternative
 
use of resources) by the national leadership, etc.
 
3. 
An exchange relationship prevails between the political regime at
 
the center and the local communities in the periphery. 
The resources
 
(political and economic) are traded between the center and the periphery.
 
While the resources dispensed by the national government are primarily in 
the form of economic benefits (such as funds, grants-in-aid as well as
 
preference of one region and locality over the others), 
the resources dis­
played by the local communities and organization are predominantly "pol­
itical" in nature, including the enhanced support of the regime policies 
and programs as well as the heightened sense of legitimacy.
 
4. 
The relationship between the center and the periphery organizations
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in a centralized political system is typically "asymmetric and unequal" in
 
nature. This means that the exchange relationship between the center and
 
the periphery in a "command" type political system takes place not under
 
the conditions of a free market but of a monopoly of authority by the
 
central government.
 
IV. CONCLUSION
 
A survey of the literature of developmental studies indicates that two
 
polarized and mutually exclusive strategies for national development are
 
generally open to the government elites in the LDCs. These two theoretical
 
alternatives for developmental strategies and planning are (1) "development 
from above" and (2) "development from below." The first is sometimes 
called the "top-down" and/or "center-outward" development paradigm, while 
the second is often called the "bottom-up" and/or "periphery-inward" 
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developmental paradigm. Experts and policymakers debate as to which of 
these two divergent approaches to rural development in LDCs is best suited
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to the needs of developing countries. 
Insofar as the Korean experience is concerned, the country has pur­
sued the line of the "top-down" and "center-outward" developmental strategy 
for achieving rural development objectives in South Korea in the three 
five-year economic development plan period (1962-1976). It is obvious that 
"the development from above," rather than "the development from below," was 
adopted as the strategy for rural development in the initial stage of
 
planned economic development in the 1960s, primarily as an integral part of 
the overall strategy for developing the national economy. It is also clear 
that the centralization of power and the hierarchical organization of 
authority in the Korean political system, that is rooted deeply in Korea's 
political culture and history, tended to lend itself to the support of the
 
style of "top-down" rather than "bottom-up" approaches to rural development 
policymaking and implementation. 
As the economy began to transform itself from the dominantly agricul­
tural to increasingly industrial in the 1970s, however, the national 
government elite was compelled to rectify the situation of inequity in 
income and disparity between the urban and rural sectors of the economy. 
Thus, the rural self-help and development programs called the Saemaul Move­
ment were actively promoted by the central government starting early in 
the 1970s, with a noticeable result in terms of enhancing the economic status 
3 
and the quality of life for many rural residents. This policy of delayed 
response to rural developmental needs was consciously and deliberately 
pursued by the political elite in their strategy for accelerated indus­
trialization of the economy through export-expansion, although the political 
culture of centralization has had a reinforcing influence. 
From the standpoint of the political economy consideration, the "top­
down" strategy for rural development may not be the most efficient and
 
effective way of bringing about the welfare to the rural population, if such
 
is, indeed, the policy objective of the policymakers at the center. With
 
the continuous transformation of the society, changing from the predominant­
ly agrarian and rural to an industrial and urbanized society, the rural
 
population must be given the participatory role in the task of building a
 
modern society. Without giving this role of participation in the political
 
process, which is possible only through the "bottom-up" and the "develop­
ment from below" or "periphery-outward" approaches, the edifice of ecomomic 
development attained may not last or prosper continuously. 
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How to move therefore from the "top-down" to the "bottom-up" approach 
to rural development in South Korea remains a challenge. For unless the 
authoritarian center-down bias in allocation of national resources is cor­
rected, the discontent and sense of deprivation and inequity among the 
rural population in Korea sooner or later will become so explosive as to 
be impossible to contain. It is not so much the improvement of the peas­
ant's status in the absolute sense, as compared with the by-gone eras, as
 
the sense of relative deprivation as compared with their kinfolk in the
 
cities and urban areas that will fuel the desire and expectation of the
 
rural residents. The failure to satisfy this expectation will create the
 
atmosphere of heightened tension and crisis which can only resolve itself 
through a popular political movement in demanding rectification of inequity 
and '. revolution of the existing order. 
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